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Abstract
This Living Review uses concepts of aggregation to analyse what we do and do not know
about the contribution of political parties to the politics and democratic performance of the
European Union. It suggests that present representative structures are better at aggregating
‘choices of policies’ than ‘choices of leaders’. Much more, however, needs to be done to analyse
the causal contribution of party actors to those patterns of aggregation, and to understand
why European Union parties do not develop further where aggregation seems to be deficient
in the EU arena.
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4 Christopher J. Lord
1 Introduction, Parties and Aggregation
Democracy is by nature a form of aggregative choice. Means have to be found of combining the
votes of the people or their representatives and those means must themselves conform to democratic
standards.
There are at least four profound difficulties in meeting such a challenge. The first relates to
the political equality conditions for democracy (Beetham 1994: 28; Weale 1999: 14). Whereas
the simple rule ‘one person, one vote’ makes it easy to proceduralise political equality at the level
of the individual citizen, matters become more difficult when it comes to combining votes. It is
difficult to think of any method of aggregation that does not make the votes of a few pivotal to
decisions binding on all. Maybe at best we can only design systems so that the pivotal few are
likely to be representative of the rest. Thus, systems that encourage competition for the support
of the median decider have the advantage (where preferences are one dimensional and normally
distributed) of handing the pivotal role to the actor whose views are the least average distance
from all the rest (Powell 1989).
A second well-known difficulty in the study of aggregation is one of avoiding non-arbitrariness.
Ever since Kenneth Arrow’s ‘impossibility theorem’ (Arrow 1951), social choice theory has been
aware of the difficulty of designing any system for aggregating preferences – representative in-
stitutions included – that simultaneously satisfies what Armatya Sen describes as the following
‘mild-looking conditions’: a) pareto efficiency; b) avoidance of interpersonal comparisons in which
some preferences are assumed to be better than others; c) independence of preferences and d)
complete and consistent rankings of preferences (Sen 2002: 72).
Under further conditions – notably where preferences cannot be arranged along a single di-
mension of choice – matters become so indeterminate that an infinite number of outcomes are
possible. Any ideal of procedural neutrality in which it is only the choices of citizens and their
representatives that matter, and not the means of combining them, collapses all too easily into its
opposite: the method of aggregation becomes the key determinant of what is decided (McKelvey
1976). Hopes that procedures can be chosen from behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ as to who will benefit
from them (Rawls 1993) have to contend with structural incentives to manipulate procedures to
achieve specific outcomes (Riker 1982: 305).
A third challenge follows from John Dewey’s famous observation that voting can never be
enough in a democracy (Dewey 1927: 207). Since voting is in many ways a remarkably coercive
form of choice (see also Dunn 2005: 19 on how democratic governments ‘add insult to injury’ by
closing ‘the circle of civic subjection’ in ‘their citizens’ own name’), it is unlikely to be acceptable
without arrangements that demonstrate to the outvoted that their preferences have been set aside
‘for reasons’ and not through mere ‘acts of will’ (Mill 1861: 239-240). Any system of aggregation,
in other words, needs to be accompanied by one of deliberation and justification (on this see
also Habermas 1996).
A fourth challenge is motivational and cognitive. If my vote is most unlikely to be one that
makes a difference after it has been aggregated with everyone else’s (Downs 1957) what can motivate
me to take part? How, indeed, can I know how to combine my vote with those of millions of
unknown others so that all of our behaviours have some chance of producing their intended effects?
How democracies respond to these problems of aggregation is partly a matter of institutional
design, and partly a matter of how actors organise themselves in relation to the political system.
Political parties are foremost amongst those actors who can help or hinder. They can help by:
1. Competing around broad approaches to government parties in ways that allow all issues to
be considered in relation to all others. This is likely to be especially useful where externalities
and cumulative unintended consequences dictate that choices of value cannot optimally be
made issue-by-issue.
Living Reviews in European Governance
http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2006-2
The aggregating function of political parties in EU decision-making 5
2. Directly or indirectly offering the same menu of choice across the political system, so that
any two voters can co-ordinate their actions by simply voting for the same party programmes
on offer, even though, of course, most voters are unknown to one another (Cox 1997: 5).
3. Simplifying choices so that citizens can participate in complex democratic systems with only
minimal information. Meaningful choice may require no more than an understanding of the
ordinal (i.e. relative) position of parties along a key dimension of choice, such as left-right; or
no more than an opportunity to renew or recall existing patterns of power-holding by voting
for parties of government or opposition.
4. Solving some of the inter-temporal problems of democratic politics. Individual power holders
may come and go, but in systems of ‘party responsible government’, parties can be held
responsible for governing performance. They can also have a developmental role where use
of a political system by voters and their representative to achieve output or input democracy
is a capability that grows with use (March and Olsen 1995). Parties recruit and train elites
in specific forms of expertise needed for representation. With time, voters may also have a
clearer idea of what it is to choose between parties.
Yet, there is no guarantee that parties will perform these roles very well in practice. Rather
than compete for the favours of the voters, they may carve up the benefits of a political system
between themselves (Katz and Mair 1995; Blyth and Katz 2005). They may fail to form even
where there is an identifiable group capable of being represented (Olson 1965); or they may fail to
supply choices in relation to a particular level of government.
So what of the European Union: do parties contribute to aggregation in ways that help or
hinder its democratic performance? Do we even know enough to answer this question in full?
After introducing the dramatis personae (Section 2) this Living Review appraises what we know
about the contribution of party politics to the aggregation of preferences amongst representatives
(Section 3), voters (Section 4) and the two combined (Section 5). Section 6 discusses what more
we need to find out and Section 7 concludes. There will necessarily be limits to how much of the
literature that can be covered here. In particular, the author has concentrated mainly on English
and French language sources. Since, though, this is a ‘Living Review’ it is hoped that readers will
treat the whole exercise as open-ended and come back to the author with their own comments on
what further arguments and sources need to be incorporated into a summary of recent research
into political parties and the EU.
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2 Analysing the EU ‘Party System’
By the EU party system, (see Hix and Lord 1997: 56) is meant here the party groups in the
European Parliament, the EU extra-parliamentary parties and party federations, and even national
parties in so far as they structure choice in European elections. Whilst, of course, the Council of
Ministers, and even the Commission, are drawn indirectly from the governing parties of the Member
States, this review is mainly interested in assessing our understanding of those aspects of the Union
that are explicitly organised for party politics.
Of the party families common to many EU Member States, Christian Democrats and Conser-
vatives, Socialists and Social Democrats, Liberals, Greens, the Far Left and Eurosceptics have all
managed to organise themselves into multi-national groups in successive European Parliaments.
Only the Far Right has found it hard to form a group at all. Only the Eurosceptics have found
it hard to cope with the left-right pattern of voting in the Parliament. Only the regionalists have
had to distribute themselves across groups formed by other party families.
However, whilst European party groups exercise the powers of the Parliament, citizens do not
vote directly for them. Rather, they choose between national parties, whose only cross-national
linkage for the purposes of European elections consists of their common membership of the so-called
‘European Union parties’ listed in table 1.
European People’s Party (Christian
Democrats/Conservatives)
European Green Party
Party of European Socialists European Free Alliance (Regionalists)
Party of the European Left Union for Europe of the Nations
(Eurosceptics)
European Liberal and Democratic Reform
Party
European Democratic Party
(Centrist/Strongly pro Integration)
Table 1: Political Parties at the European Level (Registered under the Party Statute of the Euro-
pean Union, 2006).
Since the Treaty on European Union (1992) ‘Political parties at European level’ have been
recognised as an ‘important factor for integration within the Union’. The Nice Treaty (2001) then
authorised the Council to lay ‘down regulations governing political parties and in particular rules
governing their financing’ at European level (European Communities Treaty, A. 191). In the hope
of confining status and resources to authentically transnational party networks whose activities
are directed at influencing the institutions of the Union (Jansen 2001: 8), the ‘European Party
Statute’ stipulated that ‘political parties at the European level’ must be:
‘. . . represented in at least one quarter of Member States by Members of the European Par-
liament, members of national parliaments, or members of regional parliaments or assemblies or
have received in at least one quarter of Member States at least three per cent of the vote in those
Member States in the most recent European elections’.
If, moreover, they have not already participated in a European election, they must have ‘ex-
pressed an intention of doing so’ (Official Journal of the European Union, 15 November 2003, L
297/1-4).
Yet, Thomas Jansen is surely right to ask ‘are these “political parties at the European level”
or “European Union parties?”’ (Jansen 2001: 7). Putting the question this way highlights the
slipperiness of the Treaty language. It also underscores how even the tests in the Statute could be
satisfied by mechanisms for co-ordinating the engagement of national parties with the Union.
Does the academic literature suggest any clearer criteria than the Statute for determining how
far the European Union has political parties of its own? One dismissive approach amounts to a
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simple syllogism: Parties need mass memberships and/or a direct relationship with voters. The
EU parties have neither. Therefore, they are ‘pseudo-parties’. End of discussion.
A very different approach begins, as it were, at the other end of the spectrum of party political
development. It asks not so much ‘what would be needed for full political parties at the EU level?’
as ‘what would be the minimum deviation from pure co-ordination mechanisms between national
parties that would allow us to talk meaningfully of party politics specific to the European Union
arena’ (my quotation marks)? Here the search is usually guided by an implicit assumption of
isomorphism. In the words Tsatsos report of the European Parliament, it is assumed that the best
way to recognise a Euro-party is through ‘various features derived from the image of the political
parties in the Member States and transferred - mutatis mutandis - to the level of the European
Union’ (Parliament 1996: 4). Whether there is much to be gained from this approach is best
appraised through a critical examination of the following claims associated with it:
Claim 1. The internal structures of ‘Euro-parties’ resemble those of political parties: As Jansen
puts it, the typical structure of the Euro-parties is that ‘a congress of delegates decides on the
policy programme, an executive body deals with day-to-day business, a party leader acts as a
spokesperson, and a party secretariat provides technical and organisational back-up’ (Jansen
2001: 16). Euro-parties also resemble national parties in linking the parliamentary and
extra-parliamentary dimensions of their political systems. Some three quarters of MEPs
come from national parties which are committed by their membership of Euro-parties to
joining a corresponding groups in the EP. Also worth noting is that by allowing individual
membership, some of the Euro-parties are not stricto sensu ‘parties of parties’.
Claim 2. Euro-parties are recognised as such through a mechanism for their resourcing through
the political system itself. Until the practice was declared illegal by the ECJ, Euro-parties
were funded from the EP budget via the party groups in the Parliament. Now the Party
Statute is in place, they are funded from the Community budget.
Claim 3. Euro-parties perform a similar function to conventional political parties in agreeing pro-
grammes and manifestos. Euro-parties have long agreed manifestos for European elections.
However, this may even under-state their contribution to the programmatic development of
the Union. Some commentators claim, first, that national parties form, and do not merely ex-
change, preferences on EU matters through the medium of the Europarties; and, second, that
those socialised preferences then feed into Treaty change and other policy development (Jo-
hansson 1999; Kulahci 2001) through national parties of government, and through use by the
EP groups of Euro-party texts to guide their own co-operation (Jansen 2001).
Claim 4. National parties have to some degree ‘limited their autonomy’ in favour of the Euro-
parties. The most obvious evidence for this lies in the Statutes of the EPP (European
People’s Party), PES (Party of European Socialists), ELDR (European Liberal and Demo-
cratic Reform Party), which have all allowed party positions to be established by majority
vote.
Yet, none of the previous claims is conclusive. Structural resemblances between Europarties and
conventional political parties may be mimetic only. Union resourcing may even be taken as a sign
that Europarties lack the roots in society that would allow them to do more to fund themselves.
Accounts of how and where political preferences are formed are notoriously over-determined and
therefore elusive. Majority voting is balanced by a lack of clear sanctions (in both the groups and
the Europarties) for those who do not follow the majority line.
Even the role of Europarties in cross-institutional co-ordination may be grounds for doubting,
rather than confirming, their ‘partyness’. The key point here is that national party leaders of
at least the EPP, PES and ELDR meet in their Europarties prior to European Councils. On
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occasions, ‘caucusing’ through Europarties may also impact on the business of sectoral Councils
of Ministers. In the view of some, this need to be serviceable to bargaining between governments
– and would-be parties of government – tells us who the Europarties’ real political masters are.
In contrast, claims that Europarties do anything meaningful to link citizens to representatives are
only part of a fac¸ade politicisation ‘engineered’ by the Commission and Council themselves to add
legitimacy to otherwise technocratic and intergovernmental modes of decision-making (Bartolini
2005: 355-356; Bartolini 2006: 37).
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3 Aggregation of representatives’ preferences
The last section demonstrated that there is still much disagreement on how important political
parties are in the EU arena and on whether the Union has in any meaningful sense developed its
own form of party politics. The remainder of this review asks whether the concepts of aggregation
reviewed in Section 1 can help resolve some of those disagreements?
Beginning in this section with the contribution of the EP party groups to aggregating prefer-
ences amongst representatives in the EP, much of what we know comes from roll-call analysis of
how MEPs vote. Since the pioneering work of Fulvio Attina (Attina` 1990) roll-call analysis has
been steadily perfected, notably by Simon Hix (Hix 2001, 2002a) and his collaborators (Hix et al.
2005, 2006). Yet in spite of its sophistication, there is a suspicion that it rests on shaky founda-
tions (Carrubba and Gabel 1999). Since roll-calls cover only a third of EP votes, and decisions to
request them are themselves political acts, they are likely to be biased towards particular kinds of
behaviour, including: a wish to demonstrate to the Commission and Council the cohesion of the
Parliament as a whole, a wish to check that MEPs within a group are voting as promised, and a
wish to embarrass other groups by revealing the extent of their internal divisions.
Some further information about MEP behaviour is available from survey work. The MEP Sur-
vey 2000 conducted by Simon Hix and Roger Scully for the European Parliament Research Group
(EPRG) is a rich source of information on MEP policy preferences, and on their role conceptions
and beliefs about representation (available at EPRG). Also helpful is a survey by Tapio Raunio
(2002) of the relationship between national party delegations in the EP and their parent parties
in Member States. Of course, all these sources face the difficulty that the object of enquiry is
itself continuously changing. The 2004 enlargement, for example, changed the composition of one
third of the Parliament and brought into the party groups national parties whose background in
the transition politics of East and Central Europe, arguably, differs from the more settled party
politics of most of the EU15.
Assuming, however, that the roll-calls and the surveys are the best evidence available, they tell
us at least the following about the aggregative behaviour of the groups:
1. The EP groups for the most part aggregate preferences along a left-right dimension. All the
groups except the Eurosceptics are composed of left-right national party delegations. Simon
Hix has used Nominate scaling to demonstrate that left-right is by far the most important
explanation of voting alignments, with preferences for and against European integration
forming a second, much less important, dimension (Hix 2001: 669-676). In his work with
Abdul Noury and Ge´rard Roland, he observes that ‘ a one per cent decrease in the ideolog-
ical distance between two parties implies an increase of approximately six per cent in the
probability that these parties will vote the same way. This result gives a strong indication of
the importance of left-right politics in the European Parliament’ (Hix et al. 2005: 228).
2. Government vs. Opposition in Member States would also seem to be a factor in the aggrega-
tion of preferences in the EP. For example, Bjorn Hoyland reaches the intriguing conclusion
that MEPs from parties of government in Member States are even more likely than those
from parties of opposition to support amendments at second reading of Co-decision since
‘most of the governments that supported the common position want to change the policy
even further away from the status quo. Hence they try to push the policy further towards
their ideal policy through amendments in the Parliament’ (Høyland 2005).
3. Country of origin, on the other hand, is rarely significant at a higher level of aggregation
than national party delegations (Hix et al. 2005: 677). Whereas, in other words, all votes
allocated to a Member State are cast in the Council of Ministers as a bloc according to a single
interpretation of the national interest, MEPs from the same country are dispersed between
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diverse ideological groupings and, for the most part, they stay that way in individual votes
of the Parliament. One of the few exceptions in recent years was the Takeovers Directive
which was opposed by all German MEPs.
4. Patterns of aggregation map fairly well onto the divisions between the party groups. In
other words, MEPs vote most of the time with their party groups. Hix et al. note that
the average voting cohesion of what they call the three ‘genuine European Parties’ – the
EPP, PES and ELDR – was 89.1 per cent in the 1999-2004 Parliament (Hix et al. 2005:
216). So what explains this? Some factors that might have been expected to have been
negative influences on cohesion - the number of national parties whose views need to be
accommodated and the related process of enlarging the Union itself – appear to have little
effect. The same goes for what might have been expected to be positive influences, notably the
socialisation of individuals into their groups with the passage of time spent in the European
Parliament (Scully and Farrell 2003). In contrast, the cohesion of the groups is strongly
related to the powers of the Parliament. One of the most striking findings of Hix et al. is
that, controlling for other factors, the cohesion of the main groups increased by 7.1 per cent
after the Amsterdam Treaty (Hix 2002b: 226-228), which, of course, extended Co-decision
and redesigned it into a more level playing field between Council and Parliament.
5. Aggregation of preferences across groups follows two dominant inter-party alignments that
can be contrasted as bipartisanship vs. bipolarity. The former consists of a Grand Coalition
of the centre. Although mythically presented as a PES-EPP cartel, it may be more accurately
be described as ‘bipartisanship plus’. A core EPP-PES coalition structurally underpinned
by co-operation agreements between the two groups is often supplemented by the ELDR and
even the Greens. Bipolarity, on the other hand, consists of the PES and EPP opposing one
another, with the ELDR swinging either to the left or the right.
There are variations across issues in how far voting is bipolar or bipartisan (Hix et al. 2003:
326). It used to be believed that this is mainly because the decision-rules of the Parliament
also vary. Only a coalition including the main groups is likely to meet the ‘absolute majority
rule’ that a majority of all MEPs, and not just of those voting, is needed to amend legislation.
Thus, issues subject to Co-decision will produce more bipartisan voting. Since, however,
bipartisanship occurs more frequently than can be explained by variation in the decision-rules
of the Parliament itself, Amie Kreppel argues that it is also encouraged by the Parliament’s
relationships with the other Union institutions: for ‘the EP to have any effect, it must
create legislative proposals (Amendments) that are broadly acceptable’ to the Council and
Commission’ which are themselves cross-party bodies (Kreppel 2000: 346, 358).
6. The previous points imply that it may be easier for some representatives than others to
aggregate their preferences through the EP party system. First, the dominance of left-
right alignments may make it harder for those who are more interested in representing pro-
anti integration views – and especially anti-integration views – to organise effectively in the
Parliament. Second, parties of the far right or far left are less likely to participate in winning
majorities of the Parliament. Third, representatives from some Member States may find it
easier than others to aggregate preferences through the EP party system. Taking the core of
the latter to be the ‘EPP-PES-ELDR’ triangle, Lori Thorlakson calculates that ‘ineffectively
channeled mandates’ in the 2004-9 Parliament vary from 46.2 per cent in the case of Ireland
to zero in the cases of four Member States (Thorlakson 2005: 478-479).
7. The question of whether patterns of aggregation in the European Parliament are becoming
more competitive and politicised has recently attracted much academic interest. What is
probably beyond dispute is that competitive pressure has long influenced aggregation within
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the groups. The otherwise surprising tendency since the 1980s for the main EP groups to
become more diffuse gatherings of more national parties, whilst also increasing their cohe-
sion in parliamentary votes, has not just been the product of new opportunities, but also
of new threats, associated with the empowerment of the Parliament. Those who care about
the closeness of overall Union policies to their own preferences have had all the more reason
to remove any relative inefficiency in how ‘their MEPs’ combine to use the powers of the
Parliament . Thus after 1986 the centre right felt that it could no longer afford a group
structure in the EP that reflected its historic division into Christian Democrats and Con-
servatives (Johansson 1997; Rinsche and Welle 1999). Division on the centre right made it
likely that the more unified centre left would form the largest group in most Parliaments,
and that in some it would amend legislation in a consistently leftwards direction, as arguably
happened between 1989 and 1994.
A more contentious claim, however, is that the main groups are no longer just competing
within a framework of consensus in which the name of the game is to maximise their individual
contributions to decisions they eventually expect to be agreed by all the main groups. Rather,
they are apparently more likely than before to vote against one another. Hix et al. claim, first,
that the peak of PES/EPP bipartisanship was reached in the 1989–94 Parliament (Hix et al. 2005:
219). Second, that the two groups have scope to decide how much or how little to co-operate on
any one issue. Third, that they are more likely to vote against one another precisely where other
evidence indicates they disagree most – on internal socio-economic issues (such as environment,
agriculture and health and safety regulation, as opposed to institutions and external trade) (Hix
et al. 2003: 326).
Yet, Hix et al. appear to build their claim that EP party politics are becoming ‘more com-
petitive’ on a modest drop in EPP-PES collusion from 71.0 per cent (1989–1994) to 69.2 and to
69.4 per cent respectively in the last two parliaments (1994–1999 and 1999–2004) (Hix et al. 2005:
219-221). Indeed, Giacomo Benedetto (Benedetto 2005) disputes Hix’s claims in relation to almost
every aspect of the work of the 1994–1999 and 1999–2004 Parliaments. In his view, high levels of
EPP-PES co-operation continued to dominate voting, committee assignments, the parceling out of
agenda-setting opportunities through rapporteurships, appointments to other EU offices (mainly
the Commission), and the shaping of the EP’s input into the Union’s Constitutional politics.
In any case, deeper empirical and conceptual questions may need to be asked about what
counts as competition and collusion. Amie Kreppel’s observation that the ‘real battles’ are at the
amendment stage, whilst the ‘grand coalition’ is much more frequent in votes on final texts (Kreppel
2000: 356), suggests that in the making of any one decision there will often be an interplay between
the aggregation of preferences by competition and consensus. Benedetto provides evidence of
just such an effect. Whereas in the first half of the 1999-2004 Parliament the EPP and PES
voted together on 60.9 per cent of Co-decision part texts, they did so on 90.7 per cent of whole
texts (Benedetto 2005: 76, 79).
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4 Aggregation of voter preferences
So far we have analysed the role of parties in aggregating the preferences of elected representatives in
the EP. What, though, of their role in aggregating the preferences of voters in European elections?
From the outset European elections have been understood as ‘second-order’ contests that are
decided on national issues and influenced by national electoral cycles (Reif and Schmitt 1980).
This implies parties do not do much to structure and then aggregate voter choice around issues
relevant to the European Union itself.
Recent research, however, suggests a number of refinements to second-order theory.
On the one hand, second-orderness is increasingly understood as a complex of different be-
haviours. Thus European elections are used by some voters to sanction governing parties. Others
use them to vote ‘more sincerely’ and ‘less strategically’ by plumping for small national parties
they are normally deterred from supporting for fear of wasting their vote (Hix and Marsh 2005).
Both behaviours are ways of using European elections for domestic purposes. Yet they are quite
different in their consequences for representation at Union level. By boosting the representation of
national opposition parties, the former increases the probability that the European Parliament will
check and balance the Council of Ministers. By increasing the number of national parties that are
likely to be represented in the EP, the latter somewhat fragments representation in the Parliament
to the benefit of its peripheral groups (Bardi 1996).
On the other hand, second-orderness may itself be a matter of degree, and limited ‘break-outs’
from it would seem to be possible. The following are examples:
1. Voters may get opportunities to vote for at least some parties that mainly fight European
elections on the issue of European integration. Although they are much more common at
the Eurosceptic end of the pro-anti integration continuum and any MEPs elected in their
name are probably less ‘coalitionable’ than any other category of representative in EP votes,
parties specifically organised for registering preferences on integration itself have appeared
in Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, the UK, and Sweden (Thorlakson
2005: 480).
2. Parties may give different salience to different aspects of their appeal when they fight Eu-
ropean as opposed to national elections, or voters may find different reasons for voting for
them in the two contests. There is evidence that parties which campaign with a clear po-
sition either for or against European integration (Ferrara and Weishaupt 2004) do better
in European elections than would be predicted from a straightforward application of the
second-order model (Hix and Marsh 2005: 22). By appealing to differences in competences
and policy opportunity structures at the Union and national levels, parties can likewise per-
suade voters to switch for the purposes of European elections only. Thus Green parties have
pitched to those who favour strict environmental policies at Union level which they would
oppose at national level for fear of lost competitiveness (Carrubba and Timpone 2005).
3. Sometimes candidates from the same national party can compete more or less explicitly
against one another in European elections. This can allow otherwise ideologically similar
voters and candidates to differ on EU issues. Examples include: Ireland where European
elections are contested in multi-member constituencies; Finland where open-lists allow voters
to change the order in which candidates are ranked; and France where ‘notables’ from the
same political family have fielded lists in competition with one another.
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5 Aggregation across the parliamentary and electoral are-
nas combined
Section 3 summarised research on the work of the EP party groups in aggregating the preferences of
representatives. Section 4 did the same for the role of national parties in aggregating the preferences
of voters in European elections. But are we in any position to assess the overall capacity of the
EU party system to aggregate across the electoral and parliamentary arenas combined? A good
starting point is with the seminal work of Herman Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen Schmitt and
Thomassen (2000).
In both the 1979 and 1994 European elections, Schmitt and Thomassen found a close fit (with
correlation coefficient of 0.88 (1979) and 0.82 (1994)) between the left-right orientations of candi-
dates and those who voted for them (Schmitt and Thomassen 2000: 323). They also found that
candidates and their voters in European elections were well matched in their general attitudes
towards integration, and even where they diverged on its specifics, there was a tendency over
time for parties to follow changes in their voters preferences towards integration, rather than vice
versa (Schmitt and Thomassen 2000: 318).
All of this has an important implication: even though European elections are second-order
contests between national parties, voters seem to end up with representatives whose preferences
are fairly close to their own along dimensions of choice relevant to the EU. Using the categories set
out in Section 1 and the research reviewed in Sections 3 and Section 4, it is not hard to see how
Schmitt and Thomassen’s argument might be elaborated into an assessment of aggregation in the
EU arena.
If we accept that for all the complex variety of national parties on offer across the Union in any
one European election, ‘left-right’ is a general choice of policy direction available to all voters – and
pro-anti integration is a choice of direction that comes into play wherever there is voter demand
for it – there surely is a sense in which any two voters from anywhere in the Union can aggregate
and co-ordinate their preferences through a broadly compatible structure of ‘offers’? Also, the
two dimensions – themselves broad aggregates – surely imply that the party politics of the Union
largely end up considering a wide-range of issues in relation to one another?
Yet present arrangements also preserve the familiar. To the extent that a large amount of voting
remains habitual and even the de-aligned feel a need to choose between familiar ‘brands’, relative
falls in turn-out between national and European elections may even be minimised by a continued
role for national parties in both sets of elections. In sum, then, a benign view of the status quo is
that voters benefit from a double simplification that drastically economises on the information they
need to make meaningful choices in European elections: an underlying dimensionality allows them
to make general choices of policy direction that are relevant to the Union and those dimensions
can largely be accessed through choices between national parties.
Others, however, are less convinced that present patterns of party politics can work simulta-
neously across both dimensions. Citing research by Cees Van Der Eijk and Mark Franklin (Van
Der Eijk and Franklin 2004), Stefano Bartolini doubts that voters ‘can choose a party on the basis
of its EU position, while at the same time choosing on the basis of its left-right position’ (Bartolini
2005: 345). Indeed, it might be added that two-dimensional structures of political choice present
precisely the conditions under which it is hard to aggregate preferences without arbitrariness.
Defenders of the status quo are thus forced to claim either that two-dimensionality does not
matter very much or that it can be managed. Here they are likely to argue, first, that one of the
dimensions – left-right – is clearly more important than the other in both the parliamentary and
electoral arenas of EU politics; and, second, that the two dimensions are, in any case, procedurally
separable. Choices of both voters and their representatives can be aggregated separately along the
two dimensions: through European elections and the EP in the case of ‘left-right’ preferences and
through Treaty change in the case of ‘pro-anti integration’ preferences. The powers of the EP are
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mainly left-right. Its scope to act unilaterally along the pro-anti integration dimension only arises
where it can change its own internal rules of procedure in ways that affect the operationalisation
of specific Treaty powers (Hix 2002b; Hix and Lord 1996). Even then, the EP aggregates the
preferences of representatives through legislative and other single-issue coalitions, rather than gov-
erning ones. This gives national party delegations the flexibility to combine differently depending
on which of the two dimensions they think is the more salient to their voters. Curiously, there is
probably no better evidence for this than the relationship that the British Conservatives have had
with the EPP since 1992.
Rather than attempt to settle this argument about the manageability of two dimensionality,
I would like to add some further difficulties that I feel have received rather less attention in the
literature. First choices between national parties will not always be good proxies for choices on
Union issues along any one given scale of values. Schmitt and Thomassen note that ‘representation
works pretty as far as general lines of policy are concerned’ but ‘congruence between voters and
their representatives is remarkably poor’ on the ‘specifics’ (Schmitt and Thomassen 2000: 319).
In a further contribution (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999), they elaborate on where this problem
is most acute. However, it seems to me that there is a further difficulty that arises not from
any distinction between the general and the specific in substantive policy preferences, but from
a distinction between voters in general and voters in particular. It is possible for a system to
produce a good average fit between the preferences of voters and representatives, yet constitute an
unsatisfactory structure of choice at the level of the individual voter.
Perhaps the key question here is: how easy is it under present arrangements for the individual
voter to choose differently at the national and European levels? Take the example of left-right
values. Given differences in methods used to re-allocate values – and in who is likely win or lose
from any re-allocation – voters might have good reasons for being of the left in relation to one
arena but of the right in relation to another. The Union is quite unlike its component states in
mainly re-allocating values as a by-product of regulation (Majone 1996); and even where it does
re-allocate through financial transfers, a member of a relatively disadvantaged sociological group
in a Member State that is a net contributor to the EU’s budget might self-interestedly support
redistribution in the national arena but oppose it in the European.
Of course such voters might still be able to register their preference through a national structure
of choice by plumping in a European election for a domestic party other than they normally
support. But by now we are assuming choice that is both guided by Union policy and sufficiently
informed about the latter to match voter preferences to the nearest domestic party. If the original
assumption was that choices between domestic parties allows voters to economise on the need to
acquire information about the Union arena, we have departed from it.
A second reason why preferences acquired at one level of government may not always be an
adequate basis for choice in relation to another has to do with the likelihood that under commonly
found conditions of political competition and consensus formation more than one party will be
more or less equidistant from the preferences of many voters. A sensible basis for decision under
such conditions might be to assess the relative chances of parties delivering on their promises.
Whether that assessment is made on the basis of past performance or of a calculation of how a
party is likely to be situated in the future in relation to all others, it, once again, presupposes
knowledge of the specific political system to which representatives are being elected.
My final reservation goes deeper than the other two. Even in the absence of the foregoing quib-
bles, it is not entirely clearly to me how much is established by the finding that the preferences of
candidates and voters in European elections correlate along key dimensions of choice. As successful
candidates go on to exercise the powers of the Parliament, correlated preferences may somewhat
increase the probability of the Union ‘doing what the people want’. That may be desirable, but
it is unclear that it corresponds to the core meaning of democracy. Given that we may, on the
one hand, prefer representatives who use their own judgement and we may, on the other, find that
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benign technocracies satisfy our needs, it is unclear in what sense ‘doing what the people want’
is either a sufficient or necessary condition for democracy. Not only, may democracy be more
valued for the rights it confers than the policy outputs it produces (Plamenatz 1973), but also, the
right it confers on all citizens to combine together as political equals to exercise public control by
dismissing political leaders is, arguably, a more secure marker of its uniqueness as a system of rule
than any claim that it gives the people what they want (Dunn 2005).
In sum then, Schmitt and Thomassen’s findings can at best be turned into a defence of present
arrangements for aggregating ‘choices of policies’. They do not justify present arrangements for
aggregating ‘choices of leaders’ (and were never intended to do so). Of course, this is in good
part because the powers of the EP itself do not penetrate deep into appointing or dismissing
the political leadership of the EU. But limitations on how far existing representative structures
can be used to exercise public control of office holders are also evident from the one instance
where office is designated by competition election. As long as European elections are ‘second-
order’ contests between national parties, the link between voting behaviour and the appointment
or dismissal of legislators in the EP will be accidental and not systematic. Voting will be neither
an evaluation of rival programmes for a forthcoming European Parliament nor an appraisal of the
relative performance of parties in an outgoing European Parliament.
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6 Suggestions for further research
So far, we have attempted to make some sense of where aggregation is present and where it is
lacking in the EU arena. But this only raises two further questions. The first is one of causation,
the second one of constraint. The question of causation is: where aggregation seems to work, well,
how far can that be attributed to party politics at the Union level? The question of constraint
is: where aggregation seems to be lacking, why do parties not develop further in the EU arena
to fill the gap? Compared with matters considered so far, these two new questions take us on to
more treacherous ground, where existing research allows us to form plausible hypotheses without
always generating the evidence needed to adjudicate between them. As such, this section is more
suggestive than previous ones of where further investigation is needed. For the sake of brevity,
the question of causation is examined through the example of the groups in the EP, and that of
constraint through an analysis of why European Union parties are absent from the electoral arena.
6.1 Causation?
The causal question raises the cruel possibility that we have not progressed very far since Section 2
first asked whether the EU’s party politics do anything more than co-ordinate the engagement of
national parties with Union institutions? How, indeed, can we even be sure that there is a party
system at Union level worth studying, as opposed to a series of mechanisms that do little more
than co-ordinate national party adaptations to Europe (Ladrech 2002; Poguntke et al. 2006)?
The limits on how far existing knowledge allows us to answer this question are well illustrated
through the example of the EP groups. We know that it is the decision of whole national party
delegations to defect or stay loyal in individual votes that best explains the much vaunted cohesion
of the groups (Faas 2003). Likewise, much of what we know about incentives and identities suggests
that it makes more sense to take national party delegations, rather than the EP groups themselves,
as the basic units of the Parliament.
National parties are better placed than the EP groups to steer the behaviours of individual
MEPs. In the short-term, even those rewards and sanctions that are dispensed by the groups –
committee memberships and chairs, and opportunities for MEPs to shape the Parliament’s agenda
through rapporteurships – are distributed to individual MEPs through the medium of national
party delegations (on this see esp. Kreppel 2002: 202-209; also McElroy 2006: 12). In the long-
term, it is national parties that have the power to play snakes and ladders with the careers of
MEPs by issuing passports back to domestic politics (Andolfato 1994), or by deciding on their
re-adoption as candidates in subsequent European elections. The use in most Member States of
closed lists – in which chances of political survival are not just dependent on being re-adopted,
but on the order in which parties present their candidates – creates intense competition amongst
MEPs to please national parties.
At a more sociological level, MEPs identify somewhat more with their national parties than
their EP party group. In an analysis of MEP role conceptions, Roger Scully and David Farrell’s
found that the mean importance attached to representing national parties and EP group was 3.64
and 3.42 respectively. Whereas 25.9 per cent gave the maximum score of ‘5’ to representing their
national party, only 14.6 per cent did the same for their party group (Scully and Farrell 2003: 272).
Yet, anyone who has conducted interviews in the European Parliament will know how often
MEPs claim that they contribute through their participation in the EP groups to whatever prefer-
ences their national parties have on many EU issues. It is thus possible that systemic indicators,
based on incentives and identity indicators based on loyalties, point to the groups being less im-
portant than their component national parties, whilst cognitive indicators based on patterns of
preference formation point to the opposite conclusion.
However, the implication of the systemic/cognitive distinction that the groups have influence
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but not power may even sell the groups short. In particular, the distinction may be a false one
if the ‘system component’ is equated only with the application of incentives and sanctions by
organised hierarchies. On the analogy of the theory of perfect competition in micro-economics, the
‘systemness of the system’ may consist not so much in organised concentrations of power as in the
smallness of many of the units in relation to the whole. Although, of course, there are some large
national party delegations in the EP, their average size is only 4-5 MEPs.
All this may plausibly have further implications for the ‘party systemness’ of the EP. Consider
the argument that EP party groups have developed as means of reducing transactions costs between
national party delegations (Hix et al. 2005: 212). At first sight, this is just the kind of theory that
reduces the groups to a marginal role as pure co-ordination mechanisms. But here some further
insights can be added. First, the power of legislators in all kinds of system is linked to how
they organise and accumulate expertise by dividing labours between themselves, usually through
developing efficient interfaces between parties and committees (Krehbiel 1991). Second, expertise
acquired within a specific division of labour means that switches of allegiance will usually incur
costs while staying put will usually yield increasing returns (Pierson 2000). Third, less than one in
twenty national party delegations have enough MEPs to cover all the committees of the Parliament
and even those that do would have little chance of getting the committee assignments of their choice
if they attempted to operate outside the group structure. Fourth, probably only three groups –
the EPP, PES and the ELDR – have the numbers both to accumulate expertise across the range of
committees and exercise power (as measured by power indices) in each committee. All this implies
not only that national parties which want to participate in the effective use of the Parliament’s
powers have to operate within a group, but such parties also have few plausible options in choosing
which group to affiliate with.
In sum, then, our knowledge of incentive structures and identities is insufficient to ground
the conclusion that the EP groups are causally less significant than their component national
delegations. It is possible that the organisation of knowledge and ‘voice’ gives the groups real
‘systemness’ and structural power. Yet, we are far from knowing this for certain. In contrast to
all that we know about voting behaviour in the Parliament, there is little firm evidence beyond
the hearsay of interested actors of where and how preferences get to be formed or valuable forms
of expertise get to be accumulated. ‘Large n’ case studies using methods of process tracing would
be the obvious way to fill the gap.
6.2 Constraint
A second question that requires more research is: what constrains parties from developing further
as a means of aggregating preferences in the European arena? One possibility is that further
development is blocked by incumbents. Another is that there is little obvious need for anything
more than we have already. These hypotheses are best deployed as alternative explanations for
why European Union parties have not developed in the electoral arena.
Incumbent national parties have been accused of operating mutually reinforcing restraints on
competition in European elections and the EP itself. In Pascal Delwit’s assessment, national party
campaigns in European elections are so low-key that it is ‘possible to question whether there has
been an election at all’ (Delwit 2000: 310). Stefano Bartolini argues that it is only on account of
this depoliticisation of the process by which the Parliament is elected that its groups can operate
as efficiently as they do to form legislative coalitions (Bartolini 2006: 45). Still others argue that
collusive voting amongst MEPs then feeds back into muted competition in European elections. As
one of its recent Presidents puts it, the Parliament is yet to ‘demonstrate to voters that preferring
one set of candidates to another will change policy outcomes at the European level’(ELDR 1999).
So what alternatives to the status quo might stimulate greater competition that is also more
clearly structured around EU issues? Suggestions include the following: a) allocation of some EP
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seats at the European Union level (10 per cent has been suggested) b) strengthened linkage between
European elections and the appointment of the Commission c) open lists for European elections
d) encouragement of national parties to clarify their relationship with the EU party system (for
example, by indicating their EU party affiliations, and not just their national party names, on
ballot sheets).
Given that incumbent parties can probably block all these changes through their influence
over the EU Treaties and national electoral procedures, the key question then becomes: what
interest do they have in change? Suspicion that present arrangements suit them well centres
on the observation that, as long as European elections are second order, MEPs have no special
incentive to follow the preferences of their electorate. MEPs’ chances of re-elections are conditioned
by the domestic political cycle and not by any actions of their own. Yet, they do have reason to
follow the preferences of their ‘selectorate’. As seen, it is national parties who reward or sanction
their careers.
If this interpretation is correct, national parties will be able to extract rents from the operation
of the EU’s political system to the extent that they can substitute a predictable carve-up of the
offices and policy outputs of the European Parliament for the full adjustment of either to voter
choice (Katz and Mair 1995). To continue with the analogy of imperfect markets, they may be able
to use low politicisation and muted competition to divert some of the ‘surplus’ of the EU political
system from satisfying voter wants to pursuing their own goals.
Yet there are difficulties with the claim that national parties constrain the competitive emer-
gence of improved means of linking voters to the EU arena. First, Raunio’s survey shows that
only 8.5 per cent of national parties regularly instruct their MEPs; a further 32.2 per cent only
instruct on matters of ‘fundamental importance’; and 47.7 per cent never instruct (Raunio 2002).
This implies that rent-seeking at worst works through MEPs of their own volition, anticipating the
views of their national parties more than those of their voters. It hardly ever takes the form of a
closely monitored principal-agent relationship between national parties and MEPs.
Second, it is unclear that the status quo really is a source of unalloyed benefit to national
parties. Precisely because European elections are to some degree ‘second-order’, they have since
1979 been associated with ‘shocks’ to parties and party systems in several Member States, whose
effects have included party leadership changes, strains in multiparty coalitions, splits within parties
and surges of support for anti-system parties. Rudy Andeweg (Andeweg 1995) has thus questioned
whether national parties might not, in fact, benefit from new ways of structuring voter choice in
European elections, which would reduce spill-backs to domestic political competition.
What, then, of the alternative hypothesis that there may simply be little voter demand for
parties to structure choice differently in European elections? As Peter Mair argues (Mair 2005),
publics are most likely to find parties useful as a means of linking them to a political system where
choices are ‘framed primarily in normative or ideological terms, or where there are equally valid
competing and potentially irreconcilable demands’. For reasons of both its policy portfolio and its
institutional structure, the Union is unlikely to crystallise conflict around large-scale ideological
choices, except, perhaps through Treaty changes, which are largely decided outside the operation
of its day-to-day political system.
One suggestion is that the Union even approximates to a ‘pareto-improving’ polity. With
decision-rules that require high levels of consensus, limited legitimacy of its own and high levels of
dependence on the active co-operation of its Member States and sometimes other stakeholders too,
the EU can only operate effectively by ensuring that its overall policy portfolio leaves a wide range
of participating actors as well off in terms of their own preferences as they would be in the absence
of Union-level co-operation. Even if pareto-improvements are not always evident in relation to
single issues, they are established by implicit and explicit vote- and veto-trading between issues.
Even if Union law has binding force, its disciplines are ultimately grounded in a need to overcome
particular kinds of co-ordination and collective action problems (incomplete contracting, asym-
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metric information, non-simultaneous delivery of commitments and time inconsistency) involved
in the realisation of individual preferences.
Yet if their reallocations of value are ultimately traceable to voluntary bargaining within an
overall context of consensus and pareto-improvement, the operation of Union institutions is unlikely
to provoke the significant and durable cleavages in wider society that may be needed to sustain the
role of parties in aggregating issues around broadly conceived ideological or normative alternatives.
Moreover, the structure of voter choice in European elections only conforms to the overall pattern
of avoiding single ideologically-charged ‘moments’ when a great deal could change. Not only are
European elections largely limited in their implications to a choice of one half of one branch
of government (the legislature), but the Parliament’s participation in reallocations of value are
necessarily incremental. As Amie Kreppel puts it (Kreppel 2000), the EP is only likely to succeed
as a Co-legislator where it proposes ‘moderate’ amendments in relation to the preferences of the
Council and the Commission.
Even if there were net long-run benefits to society in restructuring choice in European elec-
tions around pan-European parties competing on EU-relevant issues, Mancur Olson (Olson 1965)
reminds us that we would only expect new modes of political organisation to develop where the
marginal returns from innovation exceed marginal costs. In a political system where decisions are
dispersed, consensual, incremental and only mildly re-allocative of values, it is unlikely that the
marginal return of inventing different parties to fight elections for any one five-year European Par-
liament would exceed the marginal risk and cost of fielding pan-European parties with little voter
recognition. It is still less likely that the marginal return from change would exceed the marginal
cost if Schmitt and Thomassen are correct that, for all their shortcomings noted above, present
arrangements already provide a rough-and-ready form of policy aggregation along key dimensions
of choice. As for those who are closely affected by reallocations of value through Union institutions,
they may find that calculations of marginal cost and benefit point to participation through policy-
specific networks, rather than to supporting the emergence of ‘general-interest’ organisations such
as electoral parties structured around Union issues (Magnette 2000).
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7 Conclusion
Section 5 demonstrated that the party politics of the EU are better at aggregating ‘choices of
policies’ than ‘choices of leaders’. The former failure is only partial. The latter is more deep-
seated. The use of national parties to structure choice on Union policies certainly encounters
difficulties. Not only are the party systems somewhat less than isomorphic at the two levels but,
even where there is a reasonable fit between them, choices between national parties cannot always
serve as ‘good proxies’ for choice on Union matters.
Yet for all these difficulties, there would appear to be an underlying dimensionality to choices
of ‘left-right’ and ‘pro-anti integration’ policies at Union level. Although it is possible to disagree
on whether those dimensions are combinable, separable or fated to clash (Bartolini 2005), it is
probably common ground that parties allow choices along one of those dimensions – left-right – to
be aggregated in the EU arena.
In contrast, the EU’s political system hardly even attempts to link choices of leaders to electoral
choice between parties. Even in those instances – limited to the choice of the EP itself – where office
is filled by competitive election, party politics are not structured for the public control of those
who are competing for office. It would be hard to argue that the ‘second-order’ characteristics
of European elections have been softened to the point at which they aggregate votes around
competing assessments of the performance of parties in an out-going European Parliament or
around competing assessments of what parties have to offer for a coming Parliament.
Could things be better? It is not easy to answer this question when – as Section 6 demonstrated
– so much remains mysterious about the party politics of the EU. More research is needed before
we can tell whether incumbent parties block greater competition on EU issues or whether there
is simply little voter demand for different ways of representing publics and aggregating choice at
Union level.
Nor, indeed, do we even know for certain what kind of party representation has already been
created in the European arena. For Simon Hix the groups in the EP are already distinct, cohesive
and competitive enough to provide a basis for party-responsible government at the Union level.
For Stefano Bartolini, the whole structure remains a delicate set of elite compromises between
national party delegations that would not survive electoral competition linked to the performance
and behaviour of the groups themselves. In between these contrasting assessments is another
possibility, little noticed, hardly researched and omitted from present accounts of aggregation and
representation in the Union arena. It is that EU party actors are constrained by the collective of
national parties that comprise them, yet national parties are individually constrained by a wider
EU party system that none can easily change on their own.
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